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c-31, the Canadian government’s most recent legislative
package, devoted little attention to the overseas selection
of refugees for resettlement. The proposals were predict-
able, a continuation of the direction Citizenship and Im-
migration Canada (cic) has set out for Canadian resettle-
ment. Over the last few years, Canada’s resettlement pro-
gram has been slowly shifting from one described, at its
worst, as an immigration program with a humanitarian
label, to a program that emphasizes protection in the se-
lection of refugees for resettlement. While many of the
changes being made are welcome, Canada’s resettlement
program has difficulty keeping pace with international re-
settlement needs. If Canada is to be responsive to existing
and future needs, it will have to continue to adapt and
change its resettlement policies and procedures.
Refugee realities and global resettlement needs have
changed significantly since the introduction of the 1976 Im-
migration Act. Thousands of refugees from a variety of eth-
nic groups have been resettled in response to a number of
refugee crises. The experience of resettling these refugees
and changing realities forced all players to reassess their
policies and programs. In the mid-90s, following an inter-
nal evaluation of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugee’s (unhcr) resettlement program, the unhcr
revamped its resettlement efforts. It updated the unhcr
Resettlement Handbook, started a resettlement staff-training
drive, made a more concerted effort at international coop-
eration, actively promoted unhcr’s resettlement policy
among existing resettlement countries, and sought out new
countries with which to become involved in resettlement.
Not long after the unhcr started overhauling its reset-
tlement program, Canada also began to work on improv-
ing its resettlement program. Yet while it makes alterations
to its existing programs, new challenges emerge. Certain
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References to resettlement in the c-31 legislative package
reflected changes that were already underway as part of the
Refugee Resettlement Model (rrm). While these changes
result in visible improvements to Canada’s refugee resettle-
ment program, new challenges are surfacing, as Canada’s
program attempts to be responsive to global resettlement
needs.
This article follows the development of Canadian and
international contemporary resettlement policy and identi-
fies trends for the future. It argues that Canada must
continue to make policy and procedural changes to its
resettlement program so that it can respond to current and
future resettlement challenges.
Résumé
Les références faites à la réinstallation dans le paquet de
mesures législatives du projet de loi c-31, reflétaient en fait
des changements déjà en voie d’exécution en tant qu’élé-
ments du Modèle de Réinstallation de Réfugiés (mrr). Alors
que ces changements apportent des améliorations bien
visibles au programme du Canada pour la réinstallation
des réfugiés, d’autres défis ont surgi pour confronter les
efforts de ce même programme de répondre aux besoins en
matière de réinstallation sur le plan global.
Cet article suit le développement de la politique contem-
poraine internationale et celle du Canada en matière de
réinstallation, et essaye d’identifier les tendances pour
l’avenir. Il soutient que le Canada doit continuer à apporter
des changements à son programme de réinstallation tant au
niveau de la politique d’ensemble que dans les procédures
suivies, affin de pouvoir répondre aux défis courants et les
défis à venir dans le domaine de la réinstallation.
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barriers have been reduced: greater emphasis is now placed
on resettling de facto families, reuniting refugee families,
and evaluating refugees’ protection needs rather than their
ability to settle quickly in Canada. Unfortunately, Cana-
dian security and medical requirements are beginning to
replace these problems as the obsessions and obstacles for
the future. These new barriers will also need to be addressed.
Thus, if Canada’s program is going to assist the people it
intends to help, it must continue to adjust its policy and
procedures through a series of new measures beyond those
outlined in c-31.
Resettlement as a Tool of Protection and a Durable
Solution
Resettlement is offered for a number of reasons:
• Sharing the international burden and responsibility,
as a way to partially relieve countries already provid-
ing asylum to many refugees
• Protecting refugees from repatriation when they are
threatened with removal to the country of persecu-
tion
• Protecting refugees who are detained, in danger, or
vulnerable in their country of asylum
• Providing a durable solution for refugees who face
no likely possibility of returning home or of being
able to integrate into their country of asylum
• Providing medical treatment to refugees because they
require medical treatment that is unavailable in the
country of asylum.1
From the late 1970s onward, the Indochinese resettle-
ment movement in many ways defined the international
resettlement experience. As a result, two schools of thought
developed. The ability of the Indochinese to integrate and
achieve independence in new countries demonstrated to
many the value of resettlement as a durable solution. At
the same time, the Indochinese movement led to concerns
in some quarters about a “pull-factor”—that the availabil-
ity of resettlement was allegedly encouraging people to flee.
As a result, some suggested that resettlement should be left
to only those in need of protection.
Emphasizing resettlement as a durable solution recog-
nizes the ability of resettlement to provide a solution for
the many refugees unable to benefit from the other two
durable solutions—to voluntarily repatriate and receive
protection in their country of origin or receive effective
and ongoing protection in their country of asylum through
local integration.
While all refugees have protection concerns, and many
refugees are vulnerable, promoting resettlement solely as a
tool for protection limits its use for refugees who face im-
minent legal or physical protection threats in their coun-
try of asylum, such as involuntary repatriation, detention,
or physical harm. While the unhcr is certainly not aware
of all refugees who face such impending danger, the reality
is that the number of refugees facing urgent or emergency
protection concerns is actually quite small. In 1999 there
were 114 urgent and emergency submissions by the unhcr
to resettlement countries. For the first five months of 2000,
the unhcr submitted seventy-six cases. As a result, a reset-
tlement program, which emphasizes protection solely, is
ultimately a very small program.
The unhcr has resolved this debate by recognizing that
resettlement is simultaneously a tool of protection and a
durable solution. In determining refugees’ need for reset-
tlement, their need for protection must be considered, along
with their need for a durable solution, and any special con-
siderations that relate to the individuals or to their fami-
lies. Whenever circumstances permit, the unhcr promotes
and facilitates the voluntary return of refugees to their
countries of origin. Nevertheless, there is no hierarchy
among durable solutions.
Realistically, the number of refugees in need of a dura-
ble solution vastly exceeds the number of resettlement
places available globally. In determining who among those
refugees in need of a durable solution are resettled, the
unhcr has encouraged countries to base resettlement se-
lection decisions on the “hierarchy of needs” approach
taken in the unhcr’s Resettlement Handbook. Among the
many refugees who are neither able to return to their home
countries nor to settle locally in their initial countries of
asylum, the Resettlement Handbook tries to identify those
with the most acute need for resettlement. These are:
First, refugees with legal and physical protection needs
Then, refugees with special needs, which include:
• medical needs
• survivors of violence and torture
• women at risk
• family reunification
• children and adolescents
• elderly refugees
Last, other refugees without a durable solution2
Within these categories, the highest resettlement prior-
ity is given to refugees with legal and physical protection
needs. As the Resettlement Handbook notes, “ . . . in cases
not related to immediate protection concerns, particularly
those falling under the criteria of lack of local integration
prospects, a decision to refer for resettlement may be in-
fluenced by the availability of spaces.”3
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Determining whether a refugee needs resettlement, or
whether another durable solution is available, must be done
individually. Even when a given solution may be available
for other members of a group to which the applicant be-
longs, the durable solution may not be available for the
individual applicant.
Canadian Legislative Development
Canada’s resettlement program has offered protection and
a durable solution to thousands of refugees. Its current
approach originated with the 1976 Immigration Act. Over
the years, this approach has scarcely changed. Basically, the
act and regulations set out that all resettled refugees must
be found to be eligible, meaning they must be either a con-
vention refugee seeking resettlement or a member of a
Humanitarian Designated Class, have no possibility of a
durable solution, demonstrate an ability to become inde-
pendent upon arrival in Canada, and meet Canada’s im-
migration admissibility criteria (criminal, security, and
medical restrictions—not pose a danger to public health
or have a disability that will pose an excessive medical de-
mand or cost for Canada.) Eligibility and admissibility is
determined by Canadian visa officers at Canadian missions
throughout the world.
This approach worked well in the era of the resettlement
of Indochinese refugees, during which refugees were pri-
marily based in accessible refugee camps. Refugees waited
in a sort of resettlement queue until resettlement spaces
became available in resettlement countries. Since that time,
many new refugee movements and challenges have devel-
oped, spanning the entire globe. Canada has attempted to
respond to many of these movements, with varying degrees
of success.
While hundreds of thousands of refugees have been re-
settled under Canada’s resettlement program, serious weak-
nesses have been evident. Canada’s lengthy and slow
processing has generally meant that its resettlement pro-
gram has been unable to respond to those refugees with
urgent protection needs. In its efforts to ensure that refu-
gees integrated in Canada, it effectively barred those who
were seen as likely to have difficulty integrating through
“ability to successfully establish” criteria, or who might
present “excessive” medical demands. Canada’s efforts to
separate family reunification concerns from refugee pro-
tection concerns resulted in situations where members of
separated refugee families found themselves ineligible for
either program. Finally, Canadian visa posts, which are re-
sponsible for refugee admission, were often located in ar-
eas far removed from refugee populations. It was recog-
nized that Canada’s resettlement program was not respond-
ing to these challenges.
Refugee Resettlement Model (rrm)
The development of the Refugee Resettlement Model (rrm)
began in September 1997. At that time Citizenship and
Immigration Canada faced great difficulty in meeting its
resettlement quota. This crisis helped cic recognize the
need to re-examine its resettlement processing. Through a
series of consultations, workshops, and working groups
involving operational partners, an operational model was
developed known as the rrm.
The rrm attempts to address the problems within Cana-
da’s resettlement program by making adjustments to the
refugee resettlement system. The rrm emphasizes concrete
practical proposals within budgetary constraints. The ad-
justments include legislative, policy, and operational pro-
posals. Instead of approaching the tasks of resettlement in
isolation, the rrm looks at refugee resettlement as an inte-
grated continuum through the six components of identifi-
cation, locating, selection, destining, orienting, and finally
settling in Canada.
Within the rrm’s numerous recommendations are a
number of overall themes. As previously noted, resettle-
ment is to be viewed as a continuum. In order for it to take
place, effective communication and feedback need to be
established among all the partners involved in the process-
ing stages. Improved training has been identified as a need
by government and ngos. Partnerships are to be strength-
ened, through existing and new operational partnerships.
Parallel to the development of the rrm, the legislative
review was taking place. The report of the Legislative Re-
view Advisory Group, Not Just Numbers, proposed a new
legislative and policy foundation for refugee selection, in-
cluding refugee resettlement. Unlike the rrm, it focused
on policy and avoided operational issues. The Legislative
Review Advisory Group emphasized protection of those
most needy and most vulnerable at first opportunity. While
there was little likelihood that some of its more dramatic
recommendations would be put into place, the report’s sig-
nificance was that it acknowledged the existence of barri-
ers that had long been identified by ngos in Canada.
The federal government’s responses to Not Just Num-
bers was Building a Strong Foundation for the 21st Century:
New Directions for Immigration and Refugee Policy and Leg-
islation. It also recognized the barriers identified by the
Legislative Review Advisory Group and in response pro-
Canada’s Ressettlement Program
79
posed a “more responsive overseas resettlement program.”4
It proposed four policy measures that were adopted by
the rrm:
• Shift the balance toward protection rather than the
ability to settle successfully in selecting refugees
• Make a more concerted effort to facilitate the unity
and reunion of refugee families
• Develop a closer relationship with non-governmental
partners
• Ensure the immediate entry of urgent protection cases.
c-31
c-31, the legislative follow-up to Building a Strong Founda-
tion, included little about resettlement. Instead, the c-31
legislative package relegated to regulations most areas of
Canadian immigration law that related to resettlement.
These regulatory proposals mirrored proposals in the rrm
and Building a Strong Foundation.
Overall, the initiatives on resettlement promised in the
c-31 legislative package were positive. It would provide a
stronger legal foundation for the policy changes proposed
under the rrm and Building a Strong Foundation by putting
them into regulations. It also included a commitment to
remove the excessive medical demand provision for reset-
tled refugees, thus eliminating this barrier for refugees with
physical disabilities in need of resettlement. However, there
were negative provisions included as well. The Federal
Court “leave” requirement would have limited a refugee
applicant’s appeal rights, and the introduction of admis-
sion ceilings could be applied to resettled refugees.
Unfortunately the most negative aspect of the legisla-
tive package was that the many positive resettlement ini-
tiatives were presented as a counter to some of the more
punitive actions the government planned in order to limit
access to the refugee determination system in Canada. In
fact, the resettlement initiatives became an important part
of the selling of the bill to the Canadian public. The urgent
protection pilot and the policy commitment to ensure the
immediate entry of urgent protection cases were presented
in response to questions about limitations that c-31 would
present for refugees seeking asylum in Canada. Resettled
refugees were presented as part of the refugees using the
“front door.” And by providing such refugees greater ac-
cess, Canada suggested it had the moral authority to limit
access to those refugees described as using the “back door.”
This approach pitted the needs of two refugee groups
against each other. Pitting refugee populations against each
other is not new. Resettlement has often been threatened
by arguments about the cost of asylum-seekers. The argu-
ment usually begins with the recognition that resources are
finite. If the number of asylum seekers increases, then costs
increase. Thus the money available for refugee resettlement
decreases, and fewer refugees are resettled. Of course, if
these arguments were indeed genuine, then refugee reset-
tlement would increase when the number of asylum seek-
ers diminished. However, this never happens. In the case
of the humanitarian evacuation of Kosovars in 1999, some
Nordic countries reduced their resettlement numbers to
accommodate this new emergency, in effect denying a du-
rable solution to one group while increasing temporary pro-
tection for another.
International Context
Historically there have been two groups among resettle-
ment countries.5 One is the group of countries with immi-
gration programs who process applications at their em-
bassies throughout the world. As countries of immigration,
they introduce immigration-related criteria and restric-
tions. They tend to take relatively large numbers, process
slowly, and be stereotyped as “taking the cream of the crop”
among the refugee population. In contrast, those in the
other group are smaller European countries, mostly Nor-
dic, which take relatively smaller numbers, process them
quickly through their headquarters, take only referrals from
the unhcr with few restrictions, and are believed to be tak-
ing the most difficult cases.
This simplification of resettlement countries’ programs
has become dated. It is true that most of the world’s reset-
tled refugees end up in countries of traditional immigra-
tion. Of the approximate 100,000 refugees resettled
throughout the world, over three-quarters will end up in
the United States. While the Nordic countries are still will-
ing to receive refugees refused by other countries or refu-
gees who cannot await lengthy processing, the stereotype
that countries with immigration programs take refugees
who are the “cream of the crop” is somewhat outdated. The
U.S. has made serious changes to its resettlement program
over the last few years. It places priority upon refugees iden-
tified by the unhcr or American embassies. In selecting
the 76,000 to 80,000 refugees to be resettled next year, the
United States will not consider a refugee’s integration po-
tential.
The number of resettlement countries has also changed.
New countries have become involved in resettlement. The
new countries include Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Burkina
Faso, Chile, Iceland, Ireland, and Spain. Most recently the
United Kingdom has also expressed its intention of becom-
ing an official resettlement country. While these countries
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have introduced relatively small programs, collectively they
expand the range of possible resettlement destinations.
Among the new resettlement countries, Benin and
Burkina Faso have provoked significant discussion. The
involvement of these two developing countries underlines
the notion that resettlement should not be understood as a
euphemism for resettlement to the U.S.A. and an expected
improved quality of life, but that resettlement genuinely
comprises finding an alternative durable solution to a refu-
gee’s current circumstance. Benin and Burkina Faso’s in-
volvement has been by no means token. Indeed, they have
played an important role in responding to resettlement
needs. While the two countries have taken only a small
number of refugees each, the refugees being resettled in-
clude refugees with serious protection concerns who were
not accepted by other countries. For example, traditional
resettlement countries prohibit polygamy, making the re-
settlement of polygamous families difficult. However, the
fact that Benin does not prohibit such practice has made it
possible for it to respond to this resettlement need. In this
way, new resettlement countries expand the range of reset-
tlement possibilities.
Nevertheless, the involvement of many of the Nordic
countries remains important because of their responsive-
ness to unhcr criteria and their ability to resettle cases
quickly. These countries also remain willing to take refu-
gees who may have serious settlement difficulty. For ex-
ample, of the approximately 500 “quota refugees” or reset-
tled refugees Denmark will select, 20 or more will be “medi-
cal cases”—cases selected because of their need for medi-
cal treatment, which countries with medical restrictions,
such as Canada, would not admit.
While in recent times the aggregate number of refugees
being resettled has not increased, refugee resettlement is
being offered to refugees in more countries. Until now, there
has been substantial resettlement out of Europe. From the
beginning of 1997 through the end of 1999, more than
40,000 Bosnian refugees were resettled to Australia, Canada,
and the United States.6 Though this resettlement movement
has been declining, a substantial increase has been taking
place in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. The United
States has been selecting refugees in significantly larger
numbers in Africa. In fiscal year 2001 the United States will
select 20,000 refugees from Africa. In fiscal year 1998 it was
resettling only 7,000.7 This amounts to an almost 300 per
cent increase in three years. Despite this increase, some in
the United States view this as inadequately responsive to
the need.8
The pattern of resettlement activities in Africa has also
changed over the last few years. As recently as 1997, more
than three-quarters of the refugees resettled from Africa
were Somalis in Kenya. In 1999 Somalis still remained the
largest group of African refugees with identified resettle-
ment needs, but resettlement benefited thirty other Afri-
can nationalities as well that year.9
How Has Canada Changed?
While the number of refugees resettled has remained at
about 10,000 each year, whom Canada selects has changed.
Canada has dramatically increased the number of “special
needs” refugees resettled to Canada, from 89 people in 1996
to over 550 in 2000, not including the large number of re-
settled Kosovars. These “special needs” refugees are indi-
viduals who have particular difficulty resettling, including
women at risk, the elderly, and those with medical needs.
While Canadian regulations have not changed, in prac-
tice visa posts have already begun following the policy di-
rections set out in Building a Strong Foundation, by dimin-
ishing the application of “ability to establish” criteria. It
seems quite likely that with future legislation Canada will
remove the application of this requirement from refugees
with urgent protection concerns or from “vulnerable per-
sons.”10
Canada is also changing where it selects refugees for re-
settlement. While Canada selected a disproportionate
number of refugees from Europe in the 1990s,11 one of Cana-
da’s unsung successes has been the shift it has been making
each successive year in selecting increasing numbers of refu-
gees from Africa and the Middle East, to be more in keep-
ing with the areas of the world where refugees are located.
Though the numbers have not yet been finalized at the time
of writing, it is expected that in 2001, Africa will finally
overtake Europe as the largest source of refugees to be re-
settled to Canada. While the targets for most of the posts
in Africa will increase slightly, the numbers to be selected
out of West Africa are expected to double from 225 persons
to 450 persons.
Canada has also begun taking some urgent cases more
quickly. In 2000, it established the Urgent Protection Pilot
(upp) running in three sites: Ankara, Nairobi, and
Islamabad. The upp will result in the resettlement of over
thirty people with urgent protection needs, most en route
to Canada in a three-to-five-day time frame set out in the
upp.12 The Canadian initiative has apparently inspired the
United States to attempt to develop its own urgent protec-
tion program.
All these changes have been significant accomplishments
for Canada, given that many of them were completed at a
time when Canada and its partners were experiencing sig-
nificant fiscal restraint. While the direction in which Canada
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has been moving is encouraging, it is likely to face greater
operational challenges as it pursues the goals it has set out.
The Future
It is ironic that the Refugee Resettlement Model was origi-
nally entitled the Integrated Operational Delivery Model,
because in fact it is at the policy level that the rrm has had
its greatest success. The guidelines for diminishing “ability
to establish” criteria and refugee family reunification have
been universally endorsed. Furthermore, while the upp is
still subject to evaluation, there has been little or no criti-
cism of the policy guidelines, outside of general concerns
about Canada’s security restrictions.
While policy should come before operational change,
on the operational side, Canada is slow to alter its refugee
processing in response to new realities. This is not to say
that new measures have not been taken, but that these
measures may not be able to keep pace with new demands.
Canada has made significant progress in diminishing
its “ability to establish” criteria, in developing policy on
refugee family reunification, and establishing at least a
model for urgent resettlement. However, for the vast ma-
jority of refugees, Canadian processing remains slow.
The Urgent Protection Pilot raises questions about how
this project could be more universally available, since refu-
gees with protection concerns are not limited to the three
sites in which the participating visa offices are located. While
during the pilot some innovation has been shown, it was
difficult to have cases considered that were not in the same
location as Canadian missions. In order to process urgent
cases, waiving interviews should be the norm (based on
the submission of the unhcr’s Refugee Resettlement
Form), with interviews being conducted only if there are
particular concerns surrounding a submission. The Cana-
dian visa office in Ankara waived virtually every interview.
At the other missions, visa officers still required interviews
(some extremely lengthy despite the urgency of the sub-
mission). This might raise questions about the quality of
unhcr submissions. Nevertheless, for urgent processing to
work, it requires substantial trust between the unhcr and
the Canadian mission, in which the mission is confident in
the quality of the submissions, and the unhcr is certain
that the mission will respond to urgent requests quickly
and without lengthy scrutiny.
The issues for the future for Canada will not likely be
“ability to establish” criteria, since visa officers are already
diminishing its application (though its continued presence
is an annoyance in the face of protection concerns). In-
stead, medical and security restrictions are likely to be the
new obsessions. Unfortunately, these problems will be far
more difficult to overcome than diminishing “ability to
establish” criteria.
Canada’s medical requirements are a problem on two
levels. Until Canada amends its Immigration Regulations,
Canada continues to be able to refuse individuals on the
basis of excessive medical demand. The irony is that a refu-
gee’s medical disability that Canada views as costly, may be
the basis upon which the individual was viewed as needing
resettlement. One hopes that if future legislation mirrors
the policy commitments stated in the c-31 legislative pack-
age, this barrier will be removed for refugees and family-
class applicants.
The second issue is that medical restrictions mean that
medical examinations must be conducted. However, in
parts of the developing world where refugees needing re-
settlement are located, there is a lack of available medical
facilities and weak infrastructures, making the completion
of medical exams logistically difficult.
In addition, there has been a recent surge of reports in
the media about newcomers and health problems (tuber-
culosis, malaria, hiv). While these issues are yet to be re-
solved, and the true impact of these health concerns are
not yet evaluated, it will be important that the goal of
screening out those who pose a genuine risk to Canadian
health is not used as a way to bar the admission of those in
need of resettlement.
Security is a growing preoccupation for Canada, dem-
onstrated within the current act and regulations and made
more severe in Bill c-31. This is increasingly problematic
for resettlement. The unhcr screens individuals on exclu-
sion grounds, yet it is having increasing difficulty working
with Canada because of its security restrictions. What has
been frustrating is that while Canada has refused individu-
als on security grounds, the unhcr has found other coun-
tries such as the United States and the Netherlands willing
to resettle these same individuals. Furthermore, in addi-
tion to its security preoccupations, Canada can also be slow
in conducting security reviews, causing frustration for visa
officers as well.
In Africa, where some of these medical and security
problems are greatest, there is also the danger that Cana-
da’s program will be lost in the shadow of the American
program. Canada’s resettlement program in Africa in 2001
is likely to be just over one-tenth the size of the American
program. If other countries are perceived to have fewer
barriers than Canada, particularly for urgent cases, which
are often high-profile cases that may be perceived as secu-
rity concerns, it is likely that in the interest of the safety of
the refugee involved, the unhcr will not approach Canada
because it will likely face refusal and risk wasting valuable
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time. As a result, Canada will not be able to achieve its policy
objective of urgent processing. Instead, we will be back to
the days when it was true that “if the case is urgent, don’t
approach Canada.”
Despite these new challenges, Canada continues to proc-
ess refugees for resettlement in the same manner it has for
the past two decades. While it is impossible to predict the
refugee emergencies of the future, it is quite predictable
that the trend for refugee selection over the next few years
will be continued growth in Africa, the Middle East, and
South Asia—the very places that Canada faces its greatest
operational challenges. Canada’s resettlement program
must continue to evolve if it is going to be responsive to
these resettlement needs and meet the policy objectives it
has set for itself.
Canada might consider several initiatives in order to
respond to these challenges:
1. Implement the c-31 Legislative Package resettlement pro-
posals  As part of any new legislation, Canada should re-
introduce the proposed c-31 measures of removing or di-
minishing the regulatory requirements to consider a refu-
gee’s “ability to establish” as an admissibility factor, and re-
moving the excessive medical cost barrier for refugees.
2. Devise a resettlement system based on priorities  In keep-
ing with its resettlement initiatives and the efforts it has
made to improve selection processing, Canada needs to
develop a system of resettlement priorities that are in keep-
ing with those of the unhcr. The upp has provided some
groundwork and has demonstrated what can be done.
3. Increase coordination  “Contact groups”—regular gath-
erings of all the active resettlement countries in the field
with relevant partners—have been promoted as an ap-
proach, but they been slow to get off the ground in some
areas. Improved coordination is one of the few ways Canada
and other resettlement countries may help to overcome the
logistical difficulties they face. In this vein, increased
efficiencies should be pursued. Canada already does so
through the development of Overseas Service Partners,
which ideally will increase efficiency.
4. Share processing  Given the difficulties of accessing
refugee populations, shared processing among the three
largest resettlement countries (Australia, Canada, and the
United States) needs to be strengthened. This approach can
prevent problems of dual processing—two countries at-
tempting to process the same case—as well as ensuring that
priority cases are dealt with first. Similarly, the develop-
ment of common resettlement criteria based on unhcr
criteria is needed so that the unhcr can find a solution for
those needing resettlement.
5. Introduce common medical examinations  In the same
vein as shared processing, one obvious area where coun-
tries could begin to ensure greater efficiency is the devel-
opment of common medical criteria and the use of the same
designated medical practitioners and panel physicians. It
is obviously inefficient when a case is refused by one coun-
try, then is forced to complete a new medical exam for an-
other country, especially when it is difficult to organize
medical exams. Some movement may begin on this area in
East Africa.
6. Waive interviews for urgent cases  During the upp an
increasing source of frustration has been the difficulty of
responding to cases that were outside of the location in
which a Canadian visa officer was present. Waiving inter-
views, based on the content of the unhcr’s Refugee Reset-
tlement Form when urgency is involved, should be the
norm and must be pursued. A program intended to re-
spond to urgent submissions must be built on a strong re-
lationship of trust and quality submissions. This model has
worked well in Turkey, where the unhcr and the Cana-
dian embassy developed a strong relationship of trust and
confidence, which has allowed interviews to be waived in
urgent cases based on the information contained in the
unhcr’s Refugee Resettlement Form (rrf). In the same
vein, when urgent submissions are made, the content of
the submission cannot be subject to scrupulous examina-
tion if the urgency of the case is to be respected.
7. Introduce screening of rrf submissions by unhcr re-
gional resettlement officers before they are submitted to re-
settlement countries for consideration  If countries are to
waive interviews of unhcr cases when appropriate, they
must be confident in the quality of unhcr submissions. In
turn, the unhcr must ensure that staff selecting refugees
for resettlement are knowledgeable about its own criteria
and those of resettlement countries. Regional Resettlement
Officers need to review and screen resettlement submis-
sions before they are submitted to resettlement countries,
so that accuracy and high quality are ensured.
8. Develop a Headquarters Referral System  Given the few
places where Canadian visa officers are stationed, new sys-
tems must be developed in order to respond to urgent cases
that are far removed from visa offices. The solution should
include a “headquarters referral system.” This would mean
that in areas where Canada has no active or accessible Ca-
nadian mission with a resettlement program, unhcr head-
quarters should be able to directly submit urgent protec-
tion cases to cic headquarters in Ottawa. For this system
to work, cic headquarters would need to have the ability
to admit such individuals if they meet Canadian criteria.
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While such an approach would be extraordinary for
Canada, restricting headquarter submission to urgent pro-
tection cases submitted by unhcr headquarters, would
ensure that the cases submitted are genuinely urgent.
None of these ideas are particularly innovative. How-
ever, it may take a great deal of innovation for Canada to
ensure that its resettlement program will be a tool of pro-
tection and a durable solution, and be responsive to refu-
gees in need of resettlement, today and tomorrow.
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